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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey period, the Michigan Supreme Court decided
cases involving mutual mistake, the enforceability of a contractual
limitation period, and termination of a licensing agreement. The
court of appeals considered implied in fact contract theories, interpretation, the parol evidence rule, and claims for exemplary and mental distress damages for breach of contract. In addition, the court of
appeals revisited rejection and acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, and decided several cases involving medical malpractice
arbitration agreements.
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University, A.B. 1970, Smith College; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
ft Senior Associate Editor, Wayne Law Review, B.A. 1978, Northern Illinois
University; J.D. expected 1984, Wayne State University Law School.
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FORMATION: IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACTS

Manifestation of mutual assent by the parties is essential to the
making of a contract. When the manifestation emanates from words,
the contract is described as "express"; when it is evidenced by conduct,
the contract is labeled "implied in fact". ' The inquiry in each instance
is the same: Do the words or actions of the parties demonstrate that
the parties have reached an agreement, a common understanding?
In two cases decided during the Survey period, plaintiffs advanced
the argument that a governmental entity had breached an impled
contract resulting in legally cognizable damages. 2 In each case, the
circuit court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, 3 and
the court of appeals affirmed. 4 Under the principle set forth above,
both decisions are clearly correct.
In Sutton v. Cadillac Area Public Schools,' plaintiffs argued that
voter-approved annexation of three neighboring school districts by the
Cadillac Area Public Schools created an implied in fact contract to
provide free transportation to and from school for all students living
more than one and one-half miles from their school. 6 In Gatewood v.
City of Detroit, 7 the contents of plaintiffs' home were destroyed by a
fire that had spread from an adjacent house. A defective fire hydrant,
the alleged cause of plaintiffs' loss because of its failure to provide adequate water to fight the fire, was claimed to be a breach of an implied
in fact contract that plaintiffs had with the City of Detroit .8 The conduct said to create this contractual obligation was supplying water to
plaintiffs for residential use. 9
Regarding Sutton, a voter-approved annexation of adjacent school
districts patently is not conduct which demonstrates any intent on the
part of the annexing school district regarding an obligation to provide
free transportation for pupils to and from school. Such a duty might
be created by statute,' 0 or voluntarily assumed," but, it cannot be
1. The legal consequences are the same without regards to which label is attached to the contract. I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18 (1963).
2. Gatewood v. City of Detroit, 121 Mich. App. 57, 329 N.W.2d 34 (1982);
Sutton v. Cadillac Area Pub. Schools, 117 Mich. App. 38, 323 N.W.2d 582 (1982).
3. 121 Mich. App. at 58, 329 N.W.2d at 34; 117 Mich. App. at 40, 323
N.W.2d at 583.
4. 121 Mich. App. at 60, 329 N.W.2d at 35; 117 Mich. App. at 45, 323
N.W.2d at 585.
5. 117 Mich. App. 38, 323 N.W.2d 582 (1982).
6. Id. at 44-45, 323 N.W.2d at 585.
7. 121 Mich. App. 57, 329 N.W.2d 34 (1982).
8. Id. at 58, 329 N.W.2d at 34.
9. Id. at 58-59, 329 N.W.2d at 34.
10. See Sutton v. Cadillac Area Pub. Schools, 117 Mich. App. 38, 44, 323
N.W.2d 582, 585 (1982).
11. Id.
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said that the school district manifested an intent to undertake that
obligation by the act of annexation.
Similarly in Gatewood, providing water for residental use for a fee
can scarely be characterized as conduct manifesting an intent by the
city to undertake an obligation to provide adequate water for purposes
of fighting fires. The question is not whether it would be good public
policy to require the city to do so,' 2 rather the question is whether it is
reasonable for the homeowner to believe that the city has so agreed.
Under the circumstances of Gatewood, there was only one possible
answer.
In both Sutton and Gatewood, plaintiffs' somewhat far-fetched
claims involved an unusual use of the implied in fact contract doctrine. Implied in fact contract cases typically involve a party who has
provided goods or services to another party, expecting to be paid
therefore, but with no express understanding in that regard. The question presented is whether the conduct of the other party was such that
a promise to pay for the goods or services may be inferred. 3 The
claims made in Sutton 4 and GatewoodI5 arise out of situations far
afield from the norm.
II.

PAROL EVIDENCE

The parol evidence rule continues to confound Michigan courts.
Goodwin, Inc. v. Orson E. Coe Pontiac, Inc.1 6 and Union Oil Co. of
California v. Newton,"' two Michigan Supreme Court cases decided
before this Survey period, are the source of much of the confusion; the
former for what it says, the latter for what it does not say.' 8
The issue in Goodwin was whether extrinsic evidence of prior
negotiations was admissible for purposes of interpreting the written
agreement of the parties.' 9 The court discussed the parol evidence rule
12. That question might appropriately be addressed by the legislature. In
Gatewood, the court of appeals cited Reinmann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9
N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952), as authority for denying plaintiffs' claim. Reimann, in
fact, involved a claim similar to that in Gatewood, but sounding in tort; the reason for
the decision was stare decisis. No doubt governmental immunity explains the decision
by plaintiffs in Gatewood to frame their cause of action in contract.
13. For examples of such cases, see 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18
(1963). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) for illustrations.
14. 117 Mich. App. 38, 323 N.W.2d 582 (1982).
15. 121 Mich. App. 57, 329 N.W.2d 34 (1982).
16. 392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974).
17. 397 Mich. 486, 245 N.W.2d 11 (1976).
18. The difficulty with the opinions is not their results-which are clearly correct-but the failure of the court to state clearly and explain the parol evidence rule
and its application.
19. 392 Mich. at 198, 220 N.W.2d at 665. A second issue was whether the
failure to object at trial to the admission of such evidence precluded consideration of
the question on appeal. Id.
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at length, proffered its own three-pronged test for admissibility of extrinsic evidence, 20 and concluded that "[s]ince there was an ambiguity
in the contractual language, both the seller and the buyer had the
2
right to introduce parol evidence to clarify its meaning." '
In Newton, the question was whether extrinsic evidence was admissible to prove that the actual agreement of the parties included
terms additional to those embodied in the written expression of their
agreement. The court, in a terse per curiam opinion, concluded that
the evidence was admissible "[i]f there is no inconsistency" between
22
the proffered evidence and the writing.
Before considering these cases further, it is helpful to examine the
parol evidence rule. If the parties to a contract intend a writing to be
the final and complete expression of their agreement, then neither
party can introduce evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotia23
tions or agreements to contradict or even to supplement that writing.
This, and this alone, is the parol evidence rule. The concept imbedded therein is not difficult. Indeed, it would seem self-evident: if
the parties intend a writing to be the final and complete expression of
their agreement, it will be so treated. Evidence of prior negotiations
may not be introduced to establish that the agreement is other than
that expressed in the writing.
Such evidence is, however, always admissible to: (1) interpret the
agreement; 24 (2) prove that the writing was a sham, not intended to
create legal relations; 2s (3) show that the contract is not enforceable
because of fraud, illegality, misrepresentation, or mistake; 26 or (4)
20.

The court stated its test as follows:

1) Where ambiguity may exist in a contract, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the existence of ambiguity.
2) Where ambiguity may exist in a contract, extrinsic evidence is admissible to indicate the actual intent of the parties.
3) Where ambiguity exists in a contract, extrinsic evidence is admissible to
indicate the actual intent of the parties as an aid in the construction of the
contract.
Id. at 209-10, 220 N.W.2d at 671.
21. Id. at 219, 220 N.W.2d at 675.
22. 397 Mich. at 488, 245 N.W.2d at 12.
23. NAG Enter., Inc. v. All State Indus., Inc., 85 Mich. App. 194, 198, 270
N.W.2d 738, 740 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 407 Mich. 407, 285 N.W.2d 770
(1979) (citing 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1963)).
24. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTACTS § 579 (1963). See also E.A. FARNS.
WORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.12 (1982).
25. Tepsich v. Howe Constr. Co., 377 Mich. 18, 23-25, 138 N.W.2d 376,
378-79 (1965); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 577 (1963); E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.4 (1982). During the Survey period, the court of appeals correctly applied this rule in Harwood v. Randolph Harwood, Inc., 124 Mich. App. 137,
333 N.W.2d 609 (1983).
26. Rood v. Midwest Matrix Mart, Inc., 350 Mich. 559, 564-69, 87 N.W.2d
186, 188-90 (1957); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 580 (1963); E. A. FARNS-
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establish the existence of an unfulfilled condition precedent to the ef27
fectiveness of the contract.
Thus, Goodwin28 could have been decided with a simple statement
that the parol evidence rule does not bar introduction of extrinsic
evidence to interpret the agreement of the parties. 29 Instead, Goodwin
linked the admissibility of such evidence to a finding of "ambiguity" in
the agreement. s0 This was both unnecessary and unfortunate.3 1 The
question is not whether a writing appears ambiguous, but what the
parties meant by the language they used. All relevant evidence should
32
be admissible to ascertain that intent.
In Newton, the issue was not interpretation of the written agree:
ment, but whether the parties intended the writing to be the complete
and final statement of their agreement. If they did so intend, their
writing is a "complete integration," and evidence of prior negotiations
is not admissible to contradict or even to supplement the writing.3 3 If,
on the other hand, the parties intended the writing to be a final statement of the terms contained therein, but not a complete statement of
their agreement, then the writing is a "partial integration," and extrinsic evidence may be introduced to supplement but not to contra34
dict the agreement.
The court in Newton, however, failed to present and discuss the
issue in this manner. It stated that the "question is whether the proffered parol evidence is inconsistent with the written language. 35 In so
stating, the court must implicitly have concluded that the writing was
§ 7.4 (1982). This issue arose during the Survey period, and the
court of appeals properly decided it in Gorman v. Soble, 120 Mich. App. 831, 328
WORTH, CONTRACTS

N.W. 2d 119 (1982).
27. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 577, 589 (1963); E. A. FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.4 (1982).
28. 392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974).

29. See supra note 24.
30. 392 Mich. at 209-10, 220 N.W.2d at 671. See supra note 21.
31. For an example of the unworkability of the ambiguity test see Union Oil
Co. of California v. Newton, 397 Mich. 486, 245 N.W.2d 11 (1976). Relying on Goodwin, Inc. v. Orson E. Coe Pontiac, Inc., 392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974), the
trial court and the court of appeals, in deciding whether extrinsic evidence was ad-

missible, used the ambiguity test. The trial court concluded that the writing was ambiguous, and, therefore, extrinsic evidence was admissible. The court of appeals' conclusion was to the contrary; thus, extrinsic evidence was not admissible.
32. The court in Goodwin correctly stated that the "cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties." 392 Mich. at 209,
220 N.W.2d at 671. The court then, unfortunately, proposed its ambiguity test. Id.
See supra note 20.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1981); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §

582 (1963).

34.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 581 (1963).

35.

397 Mich. at 488, 245 N.W.2d at 12.

§§ 210(2), 215, 216 (1981); 3 A.
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a partial, not a complete, integration; otherwise, whether the extrinsic
evidence is consistent with the writing is of no concern. Unfortunately,
the court did not provide any guidance on the troublesome matter of
determining whether a writing is a complete or partial integration. To
this day, the courts remain inconsistent in their selection of a method
for making this determination, 36 a fact neatly illustrated by three cases
decided by the court of appeals during this Survey period.
In In re Bluestone Estate,37 decedent had personally agreed to
guarantee certain financial obligations taken on by a restaurant of
which he was an officer. After decedent's death, the restaurant filed
for bankruptcy, and creditors asserted claims against decedent's estate
to enforce the written guarantees. The probate court found that the
language of the guarantees was unambiguous, thus precluding the
estate from introducing parol evidence to show certain unfulfilled conditions precedent to the enforceability of the agreements.38 The court
of appeals agreed, citing Goodwin.3 9
Bluestone can be criticized for endorsing and applying the Goodwin ambiguity test. Parol evidence is always admissible to show that
the contract was subject to an unfulfilled condition precedent to its effectiveness. 40 The result in Bluestone, however, appears to be correct.
Despite its conclusion that the writing was unambiguous, the probate
court apparently afforded decedent's estate an opportunity to produce
4 1
evidence of a condition precedent, but the estate failed to do So.
In In re Chiodo Estate,42 the court of appeals concluded that a
check with the handwritten notation "labor" on it was not a complete
integration; parol evidence was, therefore, admissible to establish an
oral contract. 4' The court did not use the ambiguity test of Goodwin,

36. See Michigan Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Holland-Dozier-Holland Sound
Studios, 73 Mich. App. 12, 250 N.W.2d 532 (1976), where the court of appeals,
presuming that "the Supreme Court's most recent utterance" controlled, followed the
Newton inconsistency doctrine. Id. at 16, 250 N.W.2d at 534. See also, NAG Enter.,
Inc. v. All State Indus., Inc., 85 Mich. App. 194, 270 N.W.2d 738 (1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 407 Mich. 407, 285 N.W.2d 770 (1979); Oakland County v. City of
Detroit, 81 Mich. App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978).
In NAG Enterprises,the court stated that "Newton is in accord with pre-Goodwin
cases which use the inconsistency-opposed to the ambiguity-language." 85 Mich.
App. at 199-200, 270 N.W.2d at 741. On appeal, the supreme court merely reported
the lower court's intention to follow Newton, and reversed the case on other grounds.
407 Mich. 407, 410, 285 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1979).
37. 121 Mich. App. 659, 329 N.W.2d 446 (1982).
38. Id. at 664, 329 N.W.2d at 449.
39. Id. at 665, 329 N.W.2d at 449.
40. See supra note 27.
41.
121 Mich. App. at 666, 329 N.W.2d at 449.
42. 123 Mich. App. 254, 333 N.W.2d 241 (1983).
43. Id. at 256-57, 333 N.W.2d at 242.
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nor did it apply the inconsistency test of Newton. Instead, relying on
45
an 1893 Michigan case, 44 the court adopted the much-discredited
four-corers test for determining whether a writing is a complete or
partial integration. The court stated:
The test of the completeness of the writing proposed as a
contract is the writing itself. If this bears evidence of careful
preparation, of a deliberate regard for the many questions
which would naturally arise out of the subject-matter of the
contract, and if it is reasonable to conclude from it that the
parties have therein expressed their final intentions in regard
to the matters within the scope of the writing, then it will be
deemed a complete and unalterable exposition of such intentions. If, on the other hand, the writing shows its informality
on its face, there will be no presumption that it contains all the
terms of the contract. In every case, therefore, the writing
must be critically examined in the light of its surrounding circumstances, with a view of determining whether it is a
46
memorial of the transaction.
Finally, in Vergote v. K Mart Corp. ,4 seller agreed to sell land,
which was to be the site for a new shopping center, and buyer, among
other things, agreed to construct access roads to seller's remaining
property and dedicate them to public use. This agreement was included in the initial purchase offer.4 8 The purchase offer was later
amended, and buyer's obligation regarding the access roads was ex49
pressly eliminated.
The seller contended that buyer gave seller verbal assurances that
the access roads would be constructed and dedicated. When buyer
failed to do this, seller sued. At trial, buyer raised the parol evidence
rule, arguing that the court could not admit extrinsic evidence since
the written agreement unambiguously stated that buyer had no
obligation to construct and dedicate the roads. The trial court agreed,
and granted buyer's motion for summary judgment.50 The court of

44.

Butler v. Iron Cliffs Co., 96 Mich. 70, 55 N.W. 670 (1893).

45.

3 A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§

581, 582 (1963);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210, Comment b (1981); E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 7.3 (1982).
46. 123 Mich. App. at 257, 333 N.W.2d at 242 (quoting Butler v. Iron Cliffs
Co., 96 Mich at 78, 55 N.W. at 673 (1893)).
47. 125 Mich. App. 48, 336 N.W.2d 229, leave to appeal denied, 417 Mich.
1100.39 (1983).
48. Id. at 49-50, 336 N.W.2d at 229.
49. Id. at 50-51, 336 N.W.2d at 230.
50. Id. at 51, 336 N.W.2d at 230.
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appeals reversed. 5'
As in Chiodo 2 and Newton,5 3 the question in Vergote was whether
the written expression of the agreement was a complete or partial integration. The Vergote court properly held that the question turned
on the intent of the parties, and that all evidence relevant to the determination of that intent was admissible, including "evidence of prior or
5 4
contemporaneous agreements or negotiations.
The court in Vergote correctly eschewed the ambiguity and the
four-comers tests. 55 Both tests suffer from an undue and arbitrary
limitation on proof. If the intent of the parties is at issue, it is difficult
to see why the introduction of relevant evidence is precluded simply
because the document does not seem ambiguous or appears complete
within its four-comers. The test adopted by Vergote avoids the strictures imposed by the other tests. Under it, a party is permitted to
establish by whatever proof is available that the writing does not express the complete understanding of the parties and is, therefore, subject to modification.

III.

INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Two cases presenting issues of contract interpretation5 6 were
decided during the Survey period.57 One involved termination of an
employment contract;58 the other termination of a licensing agreement. 9
The issue in Stroud v. Glover6" was whether the term "upon
notice" in an employment contract meant that the contract could be
terminated immediately after notice was given or only after notice
51. Id. at 53, 336 N.W.2d at 231.
52. 123 Mich. App. 254, 333 N.W.2d 241 (1983).
53. 397 Mich. 486, 245 N.W.2d 11 (1976).
54. 125 Mich. App. at 52, 336 N.W.2d at 231.
55. The court did not cite either Goodwin, Inc. v. Orson E. Coe Pontiac, Inc.
392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974) or Union Oil Co. of California v. Newton, 397
Mich. 486, 245 N.W.2d 11 (1976). The only authority relied on was NAG Enter., Inc.
v. All State Indus., Inc., 85 Mich. App. 194, 270 N.W.2d 738 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 407 Mich. 407, 285 N.W.2d 770 (1979), which adopted the test proposed by
Professor Corbin. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1963).
56. Technically, "interpretation" of a contract involves ascertaining the intent
of the parties regarding the meaning of the language or words of their contract, and
"construction" of a contract involves determining its legal effect. The terms are often,
however, used interchangeably. See 3 A.

CORBIN,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534

(1963).
57. Several cases presenting issues of interpretation of insurance contracts were
decided during the Survey period. Those cases are discussed in Baker & Samper, Insurance Law, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 675 (1984), and will not be addressed here.
58. Stroud v. Glover, 120 Mich. App. 258, 327 N.W.2d 462 (1982).
59. Lichnovsky v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 414 Mich. 228, 324 N.W.2d 732 (1982).
60. 120 Mich. App. 258, 327 N.W.2d 462 (1982).
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followed by a reasonable time. The plaintiff, a saleswoman for defendant real estate broker, sued for breach of contract alleging that the
contract had been terminated without the requisite notice and reason61
able time.
The court of appeals, noting that the term "upon" had various
meanings,6 2 affirmed the circuit court's decision, which had affirmed,
as not clearly erroneous, the trial court's conclusion that termination
of the contract required both prior notice and a reasonable time. 63
The court reasoned that this interpretation was in accord with the
64
parties' intent.
Generally, when an agreement contains no provision for its duration or term, it is considered a contract for an indefinite term, terminable at the will of either party.65 The supreme court concluded,
however, in Lichnovsky v. Ziebart InternationalCorp. 66 that this rule
"does not apply where the agreement, although of uncertain duration,
67
contains a provision specifying the manner of termination.
61. Id. at 261-62, 327 N.W.2d at 464.
62. The court, citing Sanford v. Luce, 245 Iowa 74, 60 N.W.2d 885 (1953),
stated that the word "upon" is elastic in meaning and, depending on its context, could
mean "as soon as," "at the time of," or "after." 120 Mich. App. at 262, 327 N.W.2d at
464.
63. 120 Mich. App. at 262-63, 327 N.W.2d at 464.
64. The court stated:
Where a contract is open to construction, it is the duty of the court to determine if possible the true intent of the parties. In determining true intent, a
court should consider the language employed in the contract, its subject
matter, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement.
Id. at 262, 327 N.W.2d at 464.
In Hoch v. Hitchens, 122 Mich. App. 142, 322 N.W.2d 440 (1982), the court
examined the parties' conduct to interpret their agreement. Hoch involved a land contract which provided for monthly installment payments due on the fourteenth of each
month. Before the payment in issue, buyer had consistently mailed payments on or
before the fourteenth, and seller had readily accepted them after that date. In reversing the trial court's order of foreclosure, which had been based on a recepit of payment by seller after the fourteenth, the court stated:
It is well settled that, in contractual relationships, the actual delivery of legal
tender is not required where there is a cours& of dealing which justifies the
debtor in believing that some other means (e.g., mailing) and forms of
tender (e.g., personal check) will suffice (citation omitted). The risk of loss
or delay in delivery of a payment made by mail must be borne by the creditor
who has agreed to accept payments by mail, not the debtor.
Id. at 147, 332 N.W.2d at 442.
65. See O'Connor v. Hayes Body Corp., 258 Mich. 280, 242 N.W. 233 (1932).
See also Holt v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F.2d 1068 (4th Cir. 1931); Adkisson v.
Ozment, 55 Ill. App. 3d 108, 370 N.E.2d 594 (1977); Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827,
143 S.W.2d 262 (1940).
66. 414 Mich. 228, 324 N.W.2d 732 (1982).
67. Id. at 236, 324 N.W.2d at 737. The provision at issue stated in relevant
part:
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The parties entered into a licensing agreement for the operation
of rustproofing stations. The defendant sought to terminate that
agreement, arguing that since it was for an indefinite duration, it was
terminable at will upon reasonable notice.6 8 Plaintiff argued that the
license was terminable after proper notice only in the event of default
and the plaintiff's failure to cure. 69 Invoking generally accepted rules
of interpretation,7 0 the court concluded that the elaborate termination
process outlined in the agreement indicated the parties' intent to require cause for termination despite the fact that the agreement was for
7
an indefinite term. '
IV.

DEFENSES: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

Given the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Camelot Ex-

cavating Co. v. St. PaulFireand Marine Insurance Co.,72 the result in
Armand v. Territorial Construction, Inc. ,7 was predictable. In
Camelot, the court held that the one-year limitation period in a labor
and materials payment bond, rather than the general six-year provi10. This license agreement shall be infullforce and effect indefinitely, unless terminated at an earlier date in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph11.
11. Should licensee fail to perform any of the terms, conditions or provisions of this license agreement, and shall remain in default for a period of
30 days after the receipt of a notice by licensor by registered letter setting
forth the reasons and groundsfor default, licensor shall thereafter have the
right to terminate this agreement forthwith by registered letter to licensee
(emphasis added).
Id. at 235 n.12, 324 N.W.2d at 736 n.12.
68. Id. at 235, 324 N.W.2d at 736.
69. Id. at 236, 324 N.W.2d at 736.
70. In the case of ambiguity, interpretation of an agreement will be made
against the drafter. In this case, however, the defendant's predecessor had drafted the
agreement. See Ladd v. Teichman, 359 Mich. 587, 103 N.W.2d 338 (1960); Bonney
v. Citizens' Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 333 Mich. 435, 53 N.W.2d 321 (1952). The "cardinal" rule, however, is to ascertain the parties' intention. "To this rule all others
subordinate." McIntosh v. Groomes, 227 Mich. 215, 218, 198 N.W. 954, 955 (1924).
See also Goodwin, Inc. v. Orson E. Coe Pontiac, Inc. 392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664
(1974).
71. 414 Mich. at 243, 324 N.W.2d at 740. The supreme court granted leave to
appeal specifically to steer the court of appeals away from adopting the "Missouri
Rule." Id. at 245-46, 324 N.W.2d at 741. The "Missouri Rule" states that:
in agreements for an unspecified duration the principal's otherwise unfettered right to terminate the arrangement at will is limited by the agent's
right to enforce the agreement for such time as will afford him a reasonable
opportunity to recoup the expenses he has incurred in preparing to perform
his obligations.
93 Mich. App. 60, 72, 285 N.W.2d 795, 801 (1979).
72. 410 Mich. 118, 301 N.W.2d 275 (1981).
73. 414 Mich. 21, 322 N.MI.2d 924 (1982).

1984]

CONTRACTS

sion of the statute of limitations, 74 applied against a subcontactor,
third-party beneficiary of the contract, in a cause of action brought
75
against the surety.
The payment and materials bond at issue in Armand contained a
similar one-year limitation. In addition, a provision in the bond
precluded suit by a subcontractor for ninety days after last furnishing
labor or materials. The Armand court concluded that the ninety day
waiting period did not toll the one-year limitation period, 76 and then
held that the actual limitation period provided by this contract-nine
77
months-was enforceable.
A contractual period of limitation will be upheld, even though it is
shorter than the applicable provision of the statute of limitations, if it
is reasonable. 7 The fact that the subcontractor in Camelot, who had
not been a party to the surety contract, did not know of the shorter
limitation period was not fatal. Reasonableness requires only "that the
claimant have sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action,
that the time not be so short as to work a practical abrogation of the
right of action, and the action not be barred before the loss or damage
can be ascertained." 79 The Camelot court concluded that with
reasonable diligence the subcontractor could have ascertained the
one-year period of limitation and protected its rights under the
bond.8 0 Similarily, in Armand, the court concluded that the ninemonth limitation period was reasonable: "This was ample time during
which [the subcontractor]
could have filed suit and protected its con81
tractual rights.1

While Armand does go one step beyond Camelot, the difficult
question in these cases was the one that the Camelot court resolved
against the subcontractor. Once the court was willing to enforce a
period of limitation contractually shortened to one year in a contract
of adhesion against a third-party beneficiary, enforcement of such a
74. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5807(8), .5813 (1968).
75. 410 Mich. at 125, 301 N.W.2d at 276.
76. 414 Mich. at 22, 322 N.W.2d at 924.
77. Id. at 27-28, 322 N.W.2d at 927.
78. 410 Mich. at 126, 301 N.W.2d at 277 (citing The Tom Thomas Org., Inc.
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 396 Mich. 588, 242 N.W.2d 396 (1976)). The court in The Tom
Thomas case did not have to decide the issue of the enforceability of the one-year

limitation period in an inland marine insurance policy. The court concluded that the
insured had timely commenced its cause of action within the one year period. 396
Mich. at 597, 242 N.W.2d at 400.

79.

410 Mich. at 127, 301 N.W.2d at 277.

80.

Id. at 137, 301 N.W.2d at 282.

81. 414 Mich. at 27, 322 N.W.2d at 927. The nine-month limitation period
was the result of the one-year limitation period provided for in the contract less the
ninety days that claimants had to wait after last furnishing labor or materials before
suing on the bond. Id. at 22-23, 322 N.W.2d at 924-25.
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period shortened by an additional ninety days is not startling.

V.
A.

2

REMEDIES

Rejection under the Uniform Commercial Code

8 3
In ColonialDodge, Inc. v. Miller (On Rehearing),
the Michigan
Court of Appeals addressed the issues of acceptance and rejection of
non-conforming goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (the
Code), and reversed, without mention, its earlier decision in the same
case. 8 4 The statements of facts in the two opinions are not entirely consistent. Buyer picked up a new car at seller's dealership, drove it a
short distance, and exchanged cars with his wife who drove it home.
After working the night shift, buyer returned home and was informed
by his wife that the car had no spare tire. The dealership was closed,
so buyer waited until the next morning to call. He spoke to the
salesman who sold him the car and either was told that the car had no
spare tire because of a tire strike, 85 or was offered no explanation for
the missing spare tire. 86 Not satisfied, buyer told the salesman to pick
up the car since he no longer wanted it, and that he was going to stop
payment on his checks. Buyer then parked the car in front of his house
and refused receipt of the license plates. When the temporary vehicle

8 7
registration expired, the car was towed away by the police.
Seller sued for the purchase price, claiming that buyer had accepted the car.88 The trial court agreed that buyer had accepted, but
awarded seller the contract price less the resale value of the car. 9
Seller appealed. The court of appeals originally reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court's finding that defendant had accepted the car was "clearly erroneous." 90 On rehearing, the court

82. Justice Levin wrote a concurring opinion in Camelot to emphasize that the
decision is limited to cases involving subcontractors as third-party beneficiaries of a
labor and materials payment bond. 410 Mich. at 140-43, 301 N.W.2d at 284.
Whether or not the court holds the line suggested by Justice Levin, Armand is clearly
within a narrow reading of Camelot.
83. 121 Mich. App. 466, 328 N.W.2d 678 (1982) (on rehearing) (leave to appeal pending).
84. Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 116 Mich. App. 78, 322 N.W.2d 549
(1982).
85. 116 Mich. App. at 81, 322 N.W.2d at 550.
86. 121 Mich. App. at 471, 328 N.W.2d at 679.
87. Id. at 471-72, 328 N.W.2d at 679; 116 Mich. App. at 81-82, 322 N.W.2d
at 550-51.
88. 116 Mich. App. at 82, 322 N.W.2d at 551. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.

§ 440.2607 (1967) provides in pertinent part: "(1) The buyer must pay at the contract
rate for any goods accepted."
89. 116 Mich. App. at 82, 322 N.W.2d at 551.
90. Id. at 85, 322 N.W.2d at 552.
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reached the opposite conclusion and affirmed the finding of the trial
court that buyer had accepted the car because the parties at trial had
so agreed. 91 The dissent stated that there was nothing in the record to
92
support such a finding.
Acceptance is a term of art.9 3 The court of appeals correctly stated
in its first opinion that mere possession of goods does not constitute acceptance. 9 4 Buyer is permitted a "reasonable opportunity to inspect"
goods before buyer is deemed to have accepted them. 95 The court of
appeals initially found, without discussion or analysis, and contrary to
the conclusion of the trial court, that buyer in the instant case did not
have a reasonable opportunity to inspect the car.96 The court also
found, again without explanation, that buyer's actions regarding the

91. 121 Mich. App. at 472-74, 328 N.W.2d at 679-80.
92. Id. at 478, 328 N.W.2d at 682 (Deming, J., dissenting).
93. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2606 (1967) provides:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of
their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of section 2602), but
such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is
wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit. (Footnote omitted.)
Buyer is liable for the purchase price of any goods accepted. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.
§ 400.2607(1) (1967). See supra note 88.
Additionally, buyer who has not yet accepted non-conforming goods has the right
to reject them "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to
the contract." MICH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. § 440.2601 (1967). Buyer loses the right to reject when he accepts. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 440.2607(2) (1967). SeeJ. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-2

(2d ed. 1980).
94. 116 Mich. App. at 84, 322 N.W.2d at 551.
95. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 400.2606 (1)(a) (1967).
96. 116 Mich. App. at 86, 322 N.W.2d at 552.
What constitutes a reasonable opportunity to inspect depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The prevailing view in cases involving consumers
who purchase automobiles is that driving the car a short distance does not afford the
buyer a reasonable opportunity to inspect. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-2 (2d ed. 1980). Where the
defect in the car is mechanical, this approach is clearly correct. Perhaps a different
view might be appropriate, however, where the defect is readily apparent or easily
discoverable at the dealership.
Although he did not address the issue, the dissenter in ColonialDodge must have
concluded that buyer accepted the car, as his opinion focuses on revocation of acceptance. 116 Mich. App. at 87-89, 322 N.W.2d at 553-54 (Cynar, P.J., dissenting). See
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2608 (1967).
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car were not inconsistent with seller's ownership.9 7 Having thus concluded that buyer did not accept the car, the court originally held that
buyer had an "absolute right" to reject it because it was nonconforming."
The result initially reached by the court of appeals is somewhat
troubling: buyer has a right to reject an automobile that buyer has
driven home and that is not in any way defective simply because seller
failed to supply a spare tire due to a national tire strike. Unfortunately, the court on rehearing avoided consideration of this problem by
finding that the parties agreed that buyer had accepted the car. 9
The relevant provision of the Code, which embodies the so-called
perfect tender rule, 100 does appear literally to afford buyer the un-

qualified right to reject non-conforming goods, no matter how insubstantial or slight the nonconformity. The purpose served by literal
application of that provision in cases involving minor nonconformities
is, however, difficult to understand. 10 ' Professors White and Summers
suggest that courts avoid the troubling result -rejection granted for an
insubstantial, if not slight, non-conformity-by manipulation of the
procedural requirements for an effective rejection' 02 rather than
97. 116 Mich. App. at 86, 322 N.W.2d at 552. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
0. 2 606(1)(c) (1967).
98. 116 Mich. App. at 86, 322 N.W.2d at 552.
99. 121 Mich. App. at 472, 328 N.W.2d at 679-80.
100. The Code section provides:
Subject to the provisions of this article on breach in installment contracts
(section 2612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual
limitations of remedy (sections 2718 and 2719), if the goods or the tender of
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2601 (1967). But cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 440.2608 (1967) (buyer may revoke acceptance only if the defect substantially impairs the value of the goods).
101. Under the Code parties to a contract have an obligation of good faith in
the performance and enforcement of their agreement. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 440.1203 (1967). It has been suggested that where the nonconformity is slight and
there is evidence that buyer is rejecting the goods as an excuse for getting out of a
bargain, buyer might be precluded from exercising his right to reject because he is not
doing so in good faith. See J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 176 (1974).
102. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2602 (1967) provides;
(1)
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery
or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the 2 following sections on rejected goods
(sections 2603 and 2604),
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with
respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller;
and
44
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outright refusal to apply the perfect tender rule.103 That approach
could not be taken in this case. Buyer gave seller prompt notice of re10 4
jection, and specified the reasons therefor.
A limitation on the perfect tender rule is seller's right to cure. 05
Its application in the instant case is, however, problematic. Seller
presumably would have had a "further reasonable time to substitute a
conforming tender."' 0 It does not appear, however, that seller made
07

any attempt to cure.1
Having concluded on rehearing that buyer accepted the car, the
court then properly found that buyer could not revoke acceptance
because the non-conformity-a missing spare tire-did not substantially impair the value of the car.108 Finally, given its finding that
buyer accepted the car, the court reached the correct result-buyer is
liable for the purchase price-albeit for the wrong reason. 0 9
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession
of goods in which he does not have a security interest under the
provisions of this article (subsection (3) of section 2711), he is
under a duty after rejection to hold them with reasonable care
at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit seller to
remove them; but
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to goods
rightfully rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are
governed by the provisions of this article on seller's remedies in general (sec-

tion 2703).
Failure to make an "effective" rejection constitutes acceptance.
ANN.

MICH. COMP. LAWS

§ 440.2606(1)(b) (1967).

103. J. WHITE
COMMERCIAL CODE §

& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
8-3 (2d ed. 1980).
104. 116 Mich. App. at 87, 322 N.W.2d at 553. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
440.2602(1) (1967) requires buyer to seasonably notify seller of rejection. Buyer's
failure to state the defect upon which rejection is based would preclude buyer from
later relying on that defect to justify rejection or prove breach in cases where seller
could have cured. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2605 (1967).
105. The Code allows seller a limited right to cure where buyer has rejected
non-conforming goods. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2508 (1967). The policy is "to
avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer" in cases
where seller had "reasonable grounds to believe" the tender would be acceptable.
MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2508, Comment 2 (1967).
106. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 440.2508(2) (1967).
107. 121 Mich. App. at 471; 328 N.W.2d at 679; 116 Mich. App. at 81, 322
N.W.2d at 550.
108. 121 Mich. App. at 473-74, 328 N.W.2d at 680. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 440.2608 (1967). The dissent would find substantial impairment of value
because of the danger of driving on Detroit area expressways in an improperly equipped automobile. 121 Mich. App. at 480, 328 N.W.2d at 683 (Deming, J., dissenting).
See also Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 116 Mich. App. 78, 82 n.1, 322 N.W2d 549,
550 n.l (1982).
109. Under the Code, a buyer who accepts goods is liable for the price. See
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Rescissionfor Mutual Mistake

In Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly, 1' 0 the supreme
court reexamined and correctly redirected the law respecting the consequences of mutual mistake. The mistake at issue in Messerly related
to the belief of both buyer and seller of real property that the property
conveyed could be used for income-generating purposes. The reality
was to the contrary, as an inadequate septic system made the property
unsuitable for human habitation."'
In determining the significance of the mutual mistake, the court
discussed two leading Michigan cases on the subject and wisely rejected their reasoning. The earlier cases, Sherwood v. Walker," 2 and
A & M Land Development Co. v. Miller,113 when read in tandem, suggest that relief is available when the mistake affects the "essence" or
"existence" of the subject matter of the contract, 1 4 but may not be
granted when it goes only to its "value" or "quality"." 5 Finding this

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2709(1)(a) (1967). The court, having found that

buyer accepted the car, should have simply so stated. Instead, the court turned to
another provision of the Code (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2709(1)(b) (1967)) and
concluded that buyer is liable for the price because any effort by seller to resell the car
would be unavailing. 121 Mich. App. at 476, 328 N.W.2d at 681.
110. 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982).
111. The Board of Health condemned the property, and obtained an injunction
prohibiting human habitation of the premises. Id. at 21, 331 N.W.2d at 205. Buyer's
claim for rescission was a counterclaim in response to seller's suit for foreclosure of the
land contract, sale of property, and a deficiency judgment. Id., 331 N.W.2d at 205-06.
The trial court rejected buyer's claim for rescission and ordered foreclosure. The court
held that the property was purchased "as is" and its "negative . . . value cannot be
blamed upon an innocent seller." Id. at 22, 331 N.W.2d at 206. The court of appeals
reversed and ordered rescission, concluding that the mutual mistake "went to a basic,
as opposed to a collateral, element of the contract." Id. at 22-23, 331 N.W.2d at 206
(footnotes omitted).
112. 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
113. 354 Mich. 681, 94 N.W.2d 197 (1959).
114. In Sherwood, the parties' agreement was for the sale of a cow thought to be
barren. Upon discovering that the cow was in fact fertile, seller refused to go through
with the deal and sought rescission. In granting the requested relief, the court stated
that the parties' mistake "went to the whole substance of the agreement." 66 Mich. at
577, 33 N.W. at 923. This mistake was not merely of the quality or value of the
animal, "but went to the very nature of the thing. A barren cow is substantially a different creature than a breeding one." Id.
115. A & M involved a mistake which was deemed collateral to the agreement.
In that case, the buyer of several lots of real estate sought partial rescission after failure
to obtain permits from the health department to install septic tanks. Refusing rescission, the court stated:
There was here no mistake as to the form or substance of the contract between the parties, or the description of the property constituting the subject
matter.... plaintiff received the property for which it contracted. The fact
that it may be of less value than the purchaser expected at the time of the
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distinction "inexact and confusing",1 16 the court abandoned it, and
adopted a "better-reasoned approach": 1 1 7 a case-by-case analysis using
11 8
the test proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Under the rule adopted in Messerly, rescission for mutual mistake
is appropriate where (1) the mistake goes to a basic assumption on
which the contract was made,11 9 and (2) the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, 120 unless (3) the party
requesting rescission bears the risk of mistake. 121 Applying this rule to
the instant case, the court had no difficulty concluding that the
mistake was fundamental and material because the erroneous assumption altered the character of the property conveyed and precluded the
use of the property intended by the buyer. 122 Nonetheless, the

transaction is not a sufficient basis for the granting of equitable relief...
354 Mich. at 693-94, 94 N.W.2d at 203 (citation omitted).
116. 417 Mich. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209. The court aptly illustrated the difficulty of using the "essence" v. "value" test derived from Sherwood and A & M by attempting to apply it to the case before it. The instant mistake-the mistake in the
assumption that the property was income-producing- "directly and dramatically" affected the value of the property, but also, without doubt, affected its essence; " '[t]he
thing' sold and bought [income-generating rental property] had in fact no 'existence'."
Id. (citation omitted).
See also the court of appeals' 2-1 decision in Messerly, 98 Mich. App. 478, 295
N.W.2d 903 (1980). The split is based upon the diametrically opposed views of the
majority and the dissenter on whether the mistake affected the "essence" or "value" of
the contract.
117. 417 Mich. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209.
118. Id. at 29-30, 331 N.W.2d at 209-10. See infra notes 120 & 121.
119. Id. at 29, 331 N.W.2d at 209.
120. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) provides:
When a Mistake of Both Parties Makes A Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a
basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on
the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the
adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule
stated in § 154.
(2) In determining whether the mistake has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, account is taken of any relief by way of reformation, restitution, or otherwise.
121. Id. at 30, 331 N.W.2d at 209-10. See supra note 120. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981) provides:
When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake
A party bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but
treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is
reasonable in the circumstances to do so.
122. 417 Mich. at 30-31, 331 N.W.2d at 210.
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supreme court reversed the court of appeals' grant of rescission. 23
Stating that the award of the equitable remedy of rescission rests
in the discretion of the court,124 the supreme court in Messerly concluded that rescission should be denied because the risk of mistake had
been allocated by agreement of the parties to the buyer, who was the
party seeking rescission.' 25 The "as is" clause 126 in the purchase agreement was deemed to place the risk regarding unknown defects in the
2
condition of the property upon the buyer.
On its facts, Messerly seems eminently correct. In Messerly,
however, the superme court did not have to face the far more difficult
question of the proper allocation of risk when the agreement of the
parties is silent on the point. That matter will no doubt be decided on
28
a case-by-case basis.
C.

Damages
1.

Mental Distress

During the Survey period, the court of appeals decided several
cases 129 involving claims of damages for mental distress stemming from
a breach of contract. In each case the claim was denied.
123.
124.

Id. at 31, 331 N.W.2d at 210.
Id.

125. Id. at 32, 331 N.W.2d at 211.
126. The "as is" clause in Messerly provided: "Purchaser has examined this property and agrees to accept same in its present condition. There are no other or additional written or oral understandings." 417 Mich. at 21, 331 N.W.2d at 205.
127. Id. at 32, 331 N.W.2d at 211.
128. The court in Messerly gave no guidance regarding allocation of the risk of
mistake absent agreement of the parties, except perhaps in its somewhat cryptic statement that had a risk of loss analysis been performed in Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich.
568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887), "the result might have been different." 417 Mich. at 31
n.13, 331 N.W.2d at 210 n.13.
Millerv. Varilek, 117 Mich. App. 165, 323 N.W.2d 637 (1982), a case decided by
the court of appeals six months before Messerly, appeared to present this problem.
The facts in Miller as reported by the court of appeals were substantially similar to
those in Messerly. The parties entered into a land contract for the sale of lakefront
property. After taking possession, buyer discovered that the septic system was inoperable. Buyer sued for rescission; seller counter-claimed for foreclosure. The only
significant difference between Miller and Messerly appeared to be the absence of an
"as is" clause in the Miller agreement. However, the decision of the court of appeals,
remanding the case to the trial court with a mandate to follow the court of appeals'
decision in Messerly in which rescission had been granted, was appealed to the
Michigan Supreme Court. The supreme court in turn remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the supreme court's decision in Messerly. Miller v.
Varilek, 417 Mich. 998, 334 N.W.2d 376 (1983). On remand, the court of appeals
reversed the original decision and affirmed the trial court's denial of rescission because
the agreement of the parties in Miller, like the agreement of the parties in Messerly,
contained an "as is" clause. Miller v. Varilek, No. 71552, (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24,
1983) (on remand).
129. Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d
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The lodestar for these decisions was Kewin v. Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co.,130 a 1980 decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court. In Kewin, the court, after stating the general rule
that damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise
naturally from the breach or that are within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the contract is made, 3 1 announced a special rule
for mental distress damages. In cases involving "commercial" con1 33
tracts, 132 damages are limited to the monetary value of the contract.
Damages for mental distress are cognizable only when "personal" con3 4

tracts are at issue.1

Guided by Kewin, the court of appeals denied claims for mental
distress damages for breach of contract in cases involving (1) the pur591 (1983) (leave to appeal pending); Chrum v. Charles Heating, Inc., 121 Mich.
App. 17, 327 N.W.2d 568 (1982); Groh v. Broadland Builders, 120 Mich. App. 214,
327 N.W.2d 443 (1982).
130. 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980). In Kewin, the court held that a
disability income protection policy was "commercial" in nature and mental distress
damages, therefore, could not be recovered for mere breach. Id. at 419, 295 N.W.2d

at 55.
131. Id. at 414, 295 N.W.2d at 52-53. The rule stated by the Kewin court is the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
132. Commercial contracts are those in which pecuniary interests predominate.

409 Mich. at 416, 295 N.W.2d at 53.
133. Id. at 414-15, 295 N.W.2d at 53. The assumption in breach of contract
cases is that a party may be adequately compensated by reference to the terms of the
contract alone. Id. at 417, 295 N.W.2d at 54.
By labeling insurance policies commercial in nature, the Kewin court was able to
avoid the question of whether the particular insurance contract at issue implicated
matters of mental concern and solicitude. See Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84
N.W.2d 816 (1957).
Before Kewin, several cases had allowed mental distress damages for breach of insurance contracts. See Seaton v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 75 Mich. App. 252, 254
N.W.2d 858 (1977); Palmer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 74 Mich. App. 259, 254 N.W.2d
52, leave to appeal denied, 401 Mich. 808 (1977); McCune v. Grimaldi Buick-Opel,
Inc., 45 Mich. App. 472, 206 N.W.2d 742 (1973).
In an automobile insurance case decided during the Survey period, the court of
appeals, following Kewin and its considerable progeny, denied plaintiffs claim for
mental distress damages which was based solely on defendant's breach of a no-fault
policy. Butler v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 121 Mich. App. 727, 329 N.W.2d 781
(1982).
134. Personal contracts are those "concerned not with trade and commerce but
with life and death, not with profit but with elements of personality, not with
pecuniary aggrandizement but with matters of mental concern and solicitude"
whereby a breach would "inevitably and necessarily result in mental anguish, pain and
suffering". Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 471, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957) (child
stillborn due to doctor's failure to perform caesarean section as agreed upon).
Other Michigan cases illustrating Stewart-type contracts are Allinger v. Kell, 102
Mich. App. 798, 302 N.W.2d 576 (1981) (damages allowed for funeral director's
mutilation of the body of plaintiffs murdered daughter); Avery v. Arnold Home, Inc.,
17 Mich. App. 240, 169 N.W.2d 135 (1969) (damages allowed for nursing homes'
failure to alert plaintiff to his mother's impending death).
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chase of a defective furnance which caused a fire that destroyed the
buyer's home and its contents 135, (2) the construction of a home with a
malfunctioning septic system,1 36 and (3) employment.

137

These con-

tracts were deemed "commercial", not "personal" and, accordingly,
under Kewin, a per se bar existed to the grant of mental distress
damages. 3 8
We question whether the distinction between "commercial" and
"personal" contracts is as clear as Kewin suggests. The decision in the
employment contract case 3 9 drew a strong dissent contending that an
employment contract involved important personal rights and
1 40
Since
dignities, and was by no means solely commercial in nature.
mental and emotional distress are reasonably foreseeable results of
breach of an employment contract, the dissent took the view that the
judgment on plaintiff's mental
trial court's award of a summary
41
distress claim was inappropriate. '
There is much to be said for the position taken by the dissent.
Contracts often have elements of both a commercial and a personal
nature. Rather than attempting to squeeze a contract into one
category or the other, a test based upon damages within the con42
templation of the parties would seem to be the better approach.
2.

Exemplary

The court of appeals dealt rather summarily with a claim
for exemplary damages. In Valentine v. General American
Credit, Inc., 4 3 plaintiff requested punitive, 44 mental dis135. Chrum v. Charles Heating, Inc., 121 Mich. App. 17, 327 N.W.2d 568
(1982).
136. Groh v. Broadland Builders, 120 Mich. App. 214, 327 N.W.2d 443 (1982).
137. Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d
591 (1983) (leave to appeal pending).
138. In Valentine, the court, while concluding that the contract was commercial, noted that it would not necessarily view all employment contracts as such. Plaintiff in Valentine simply failed to state facts demonstrating that the contract had any
personal aspects. Id. at 525-26, 332 N.W.2d at 593.
139. Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d
591 (1983) (leave to appeal pending).
140. Id. at 530, 332 N.W.2d at 595 (Gillis, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Justice Williams, in a lengthy dissent in Kewin, urged the court to adopt
this approach. He argued that the disability insurance contract at issue in Kewin did
involve matters of mental concern and solicitude, and that emotional distress damages
were within the contemplation of the parties or arose naturally from the breach. 409
Mich. at 424, 295 N.W.2d at 57 (Williams, J., dissenting).
143. 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d 591, (leave to appeal pending) (1983).
144. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment. The court of appeals apparently affirmed the denial of plaintiff's claim for punitive damages,
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tress, 14 5 and exemplary damages for breach of an employment contract. In affirming the trial court's entry of a summary judgment on
the exemplary damages claim, the court of appeals simply quoted
from Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. 16 for the
proposition that "absent allegation and proof of tortious conduct existing independent of the breach ... exemplary damages may not be
awarded in common law actions brought for breach of a commercial
contract.' 47 The court concluded that plaintiff had made no such
claim. 148
VI.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Patients continue to argue that agreements entered into with doctors or hospitals to arbitrate malpractice disputes are unenforceable.
The issues have not changed during this Survey period; 149 nor to any
significant extent has the response of the court of appeals.
Challenges to the enforceability of these agreements are generally
made on three grounds: (1) the Medical Malpractice Arbitration
Act'8 0 (MMAA) is unconstitutional; 151 (2) the agreements are unconsalthough the majority opinion fails to address the issue. The dissent did speak to it,
but only to state that the claim was wholly without merit since "Michigan law prohibits
an award of punitive damages." Id. at 531, 332 N.W.2d at 595 (citing Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
145. See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
146. 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
147. 123 Mich. App. at 525, 332 N.W.2d at 593 (quoting Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980)). For a discussion of
the "commercial" contract versus "personal" contract distinction suggested in Kewin,
see supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.

148. 123 Mich. App. at 525, 332 N.W.2d at 593. Recovery of exemplary
damages requires proof that defendant's conduct was malicious, wilful and wanton,
and caused feelings of humiliation, outrage, and indignity. "The theory of these cases
is that the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct both intensifies the injury and
justifies the award of exemplary damages as compensation for the harm done the
plaintiff's feelings." 409 Mich. at 419, 295 N.W.2d at 55.
Mental distress and exemplary damages are considered duplicative; each is intended to compensate for injured feelings. Plaintiff may submit both theories to the
jury, but recovery is limited to one. Veselenak v. Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 572, 327
N.W.2d 261, 263 (1982). See also Valentine v. General Amer. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich.
App. at 532, 332 N.W.2d at 596 (1983) (Gillis, J., dissenting) (leave to appeal pending).
149. See W. Volz & D. Brouwer, Contracts, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 491, 523-28
(1983).
150. MicH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040 - .5065 (Supp. 1983-84).
151. See, e.g., Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325
N.W.2d 619 (1982); Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558 (1982);
Christman v. Sisters of Mercy, 118 Mich. App. 719, 325 N.W.2d 801 (1982); Gale v.
Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439 (1982); Strong v. Oakwood
Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118
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53
Addicionable; 12 and (3) the agreements are contracts of adhesion.
tionally, patients contend that arbitration agreements cannot be enforced against them absent a showing by the doctor or hospital of a
by the patient of the conknowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
5 4
courts.1
the
to
access
of
right
stitutional

A.

Constitutionality of the MMAA

The court of appeals is sharply divided over the constitutionality
of the MMAA.155 Several cases were decided during the Survey
period. 5 6 In all but one' 5 the court struck down the MMAA on constitutional grounds.
Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982); Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich.
App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appealgranted, 412 Mich. 885 (1981); Morris v.
Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910, leave to appeal granted, 412
Mich. 884 (1981); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).
152. See, e.g., Gale v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439
(1982); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435
(1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982); Jackson v.
Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal granted,
412 Mich. 885 (1981); Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910,
leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 884 (1981).
153. See, e.g., Gale v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439
(1982); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435
(1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982); Jackson v.
Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal granted,
412 Mich. 885 (1981); Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910,
leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 884 (1981).
154. See, e.g., Moore v. Fragatos, 116 Mich. App. 179, 321 N.W.2d 781
(1982); Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202,
312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 885 (1981); Brief for Appellant
at 7, Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910, leave to appeal
granted, 412 Mich. 884 (1981).
155. Compare Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325
N.W.2d 435 (1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982);
Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal
granted, 412 Mich. 885 (1981); Piskorski v. Art Centre Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 22, 312
N.W.2d 160 (1981) with Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558
(1982); Cushman v. Frankel, 111 Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d 705 (1981); Williams
v. O'Connor, 108 Mich. App. 613, 310 N.W.2d 825 (1981); Morris v. Metriyakool,
107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910, leave to appealgranted,412 Mich. 884 (1981).
156. Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d
619 (1982); Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558 (1982); Christman
v. Sisters of Mercy, 118 Mich. App. 719, 325 N.W.2d 801 (1982); Gale v. Providence
Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439 (1982); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp.
Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich.
App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982); Strong v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp. 117 Mich. App. 143,
323 N.W.2d 629 (1982).
157. Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558 (1982). The court
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the patient's claim that the arbitration agree-
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Plaintiffs challenging the MMAA consistently contend that it
violates the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the United
States 58 and the State of Michigan. 5 9 Specifically, it is alleged that
because the MMAA requires a health care provider to be one of the
are deprived of a
three members of the arbitration panel,1 6 0 patients
16
fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. '
Two sources of bias or partiality are advanced: health care providers have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of these
arbitrations,16 2 and in the context of a malpractice controversy, will
ment was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 749, 325 N.W.2d at 562.
Two judges of the court of appeals, N.J. Kaufman and D. Riley, changed their
positions regarding the constitutionality of the MMAA. Both had previously found the
MMAA constitutional and each wrote an opinion explaining the reasons for now
holding the contrary view. See Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d
422 (1982); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435
(1982).
The seven cases decided during the Survey period do not appear to be representative of the views of the members of the court of appeals to the extent they suggest
substantial agreement that the MMAA is unconstitutional. In fact, in Horn v. Cooke,
118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558 (1982), the court of appeals stated: "The majority of the members of the Court who have ruled on this issue have found that the
Act is constitutional." Id. at 749, 325 N.W.2d at 562.
158.
159.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17.

§

1.

160. The MMAA provides:
An arbitration under this chapter shall be heard by a panel of 3 arbitrators.
One shall be an attorney who shall be the chairperson and shall have
jurisdiction over prehearing procedures, 1 shall be a physician, preferably
but not necessarily from the respondent's medical specialty, and the third
shall be a person who is neither a licensee of the health profession involved, a
lawyer, nor a representative of a hospital or an insurance company. Where a
case involves a hospital only, a hospital administrator may be substituted for
a physician. If a case involves a health care provider other than a physician,
a licensee of the health profession involved may be substituted for a physician.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.

§

600.5044(2) (Supp. 1982-83).

161. See, e.g., Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982);
Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982);
Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal
granted, 412 Mich. 885 (1981); Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309
N.W.2d 910, leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 884 (1981).
162. The United States Supreme Court has held that a person's due process
right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal is violated where the decisionmaker has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 410 (1927). See also Crampton v. Department of State, 395 Mich. 347, 235
N.W.2d 352 (1975). Patients contend that because the number and size of malpractice
awards affect directly the availability and cost of medical malpractice insurance,
health care providers have a direct economic interest in minimizing those awards. See,
e.g., Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. at 363-65, 325 N.W.2d at 428-29.
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align themselves with the doctor, a member of their own profession,
6 3
against the patient.
B.

Unconscionability

Until this Survey period, no panel of the court of appeals had
found meritorious the claim that medical malpractice arbitration
agreements were unconscionable.1 64 Now, however, Judges Cynar and
Riley, who sat together on the panels that decided three of the seven
cases reported last year, 65 agree that these contracts are unconscionable. The "inherent disproportionate bargaining position" between a patient and a hospital or doctor,16 6 and the substantive
unreasonableness of these agreements, 67 persuaded Judge Riley that
they are unconscionable. Judge Cynar's determination of unconscionability rested on the somewhat different basis that the patient
lacked a meaningful opportunity to decide whether to forego the con6
stitutional right of access to the courts.
In responding to these views, Judge Maher indicated agreement
that enforcement of these contracts is unwise, but stated that the
legislature, in adopting the MMAA, has declared the state's public
policy, a declaration that cannot be judicially overridden by holding
6 9
these contracts unconscionable.1
C.

Contracts of Adhesion

No panel of the court of appeals has found these agreements to be
"take-it-or-leave-it" contracts of adhesion. 7 0 A patient can obtain
medical treatment without entering into an arbitration agreement.'7
163. "The pertinent issue is not whether a particular group or profession is or is
not fair-minded, but whether the function and frame of reference of such persons may
be expected to make them partisan to their fellows." Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich.
App. at 361, 325 N.W.2d at 427. See Crampton v. Department of State, 395 Mich.
347, 235 N.W.2d 352 (1975).
164. "The panels have been unanimous in rejecting claims that the arbitration
agreement form is unconscionable or an adhesion contract (citations omitted). We
agree that these claims are without merit." Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. at
355-56, 325 N.W.2d at 424-25.
165. Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d
619 (1982); Gale v. Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439 (1982);
Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982).
166. 118 Mich. App. at 401-02, 325 N.W.2d at 438.
167. Id. at 402-03, 325 N.W.2d at 438.
168. 118 Mich. App. at 411, 325 N.W.2d at 441.
169. 118 Mich. App. at 403-04, 325 N.W.2d at 439.
170. See Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 118 Mich. App. at 400, 325 N.W.2d
at 437; Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. at 355-56, 325 N.W.2d at 424.
171. A health care provider who conditions treatment on the signing of an arbitration agreement violates the MMAA. MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.5041(2)
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Additionally, patients have sixty
days after agreeing to arbitration to
172
withdraw from the contract.
We are of the view that further comment upon these issues is not
now warranted. These matters have been briefed and argued before
the supreme court 7 3 and a decision should soon be reached, quite
possibly before this Survey is in print. After the supreme court speaks,
a full analysis will be possible, an analysis best left to the next Survey.

(Supp. 1982-83). See Capman v. Harper Grace Hosp., 96 Mich. App. 510, 294
N.W.2d 205 (1980). See also Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558
(1982).
172. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5041(1), (3) (Supp. 1982-83).
173. Morris v. Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910, leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 884 (1981); Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App.
202, 312 N.W.2d 212, leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 885 (1981). Eight other
cases have been held in abeyance pending the outcome of Morris andjackson: Lovell
v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d 619 (1982); Murray
v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422 (1982); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp.
Corp., 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982); Malek v. Jayakar, 116 Mich.
App. 111, 321 N.W.2d 858 (1982); Rome v. Sinai Hosp., 112 Mich. App. 387, 316
N.W.2d 428 (1982); Cushman v. Frankel, 111 Mich. App. 605, 314 N.W.2d 705
(1981); Piskorski v. Art Centre Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 22, 312 N.W.2d 441 (1981);
Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981).

